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L’idée sans limites. Le principe husserlien de la Gegebenheit à l’épreuve du néo-kantisme

par philo.doctes (23/04/2014)

Intervention du 24 avril de Emanuele Mariani :

Résumé : What are the limits of phenomenology ? Are there boundaries beyond which the phenomenon ceases to be ? These questions refer to a distinction already well established by Kantian criticism : Grenze or Schranke, limit or boundary ? With a challenging review of the Ideen I, these very questions have then been directly formulated by Natorp, a neo-Kantian from Marburg among the most attentive to Husserl’s phenomenology. From a phenomenological point of view, the weakness of criticism lies nevertheless in what criticism itself considers absurd : behind the phenomenon, nothing. Thus, a consequence of great importance follows : the dissolution of the Grenze prescribes an unlimited opening (Grenzenlösigkeit) to the horizon of manifestation. Everything is phenomenon. But if we can speak of a limitless opening, it is because somehow we can see it. What kind of view is it ? And what type of donation is at work here ? This is one of the main issues Husserl confronts in Ideen I. And the solution, as we shall see, is the recovery of a concept, the « idea in the Kantian sense », without its counterpart, the « limit », whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the limit that defines the status of the idea.